Legal subjectivity, particularly that of the majnūn (insane), is an understudied topic that is often only glossed
over or nominally referenced in academic scholarship on Islamic jurisprudence. In attempting to fill this gap
in scholarship, this article aims at examining the epistemological and ethical dimensions of legal subjectivity,
particularly as it relates to the insane. The article takes the concept of taklīf in classical Ash'arite works of
jurisprudence as the center of its analysis of legal subjectivity. Taklīf, its characteristics, the relationship
between the law giver and the legal subject, and the host of epistemological and ethical assumptions embedded
in assigning legal subjectivity to certain individuals and excluding others from it, were among the main
issues that classical Muslim jurists grappled with. Understanding the concept of taklīf as a form of
prescriptive speech, Ash‘arite jurist-theologians went on to articulate a theory of legal subjectivity that
emphasized the mental capability of the legal subject to comprehend the moral import of divine prescriptive
address and to respond to it with cognizant and intentional obedience. In stressing the value of cognitive
ability, Ash‘arī jurists contended that the majnūn’s comprehending capacity fell short of the level necessary to
acquire legal subjectivity. Beyond the issue of the legal subjectivity of the insane, studying the concept of taklīf
allows us to understand severe ways in which Ash‘arī jurists conceived of reason/rationality, the relationship
between intentionality, knowledge and action, and the nature of divine speech and its normative value.