The differences that emerged in the fiqh method regarding the definition of the judgment have a
kalām-based ground. Alā al-Dīn al-Samarqandī talks about the theological ground of the theory of
judgment and expresses the effect of theological divergences on the differences regarding the nature of the
judgment. As a reaction to the Mu'tazila's understanding of good-evil/husn-kubh, that the judgments of
actions can be known even before the shari’a comes, the Ash'arites claim that the mind cannot judge the
goodness or badness of an action, that the mind does not require gratitude to the one who gives blessings,
and that actions do not have any judgment before the bad thing comes. Also, in the basis of the problem
of adīth-ra’y lies of the differences of opinion that emerged in the theory of judgment. It is obvious that
the Qur'an and the sunnah are the two most important sources. However, it is also known that the
collection of hadiths causes a narrowing of the field of judgment with reason. Since they are the source of
the adīth-ra’y discussions, the authority of the Qur'an and the Sunnah is mentioned here. Here again,
it should be emphasized that the authority of the Qur'an and Sunnah is provided by the kalam. The
determination of the Divine will as the only authorized element in making judgments has also been
determined by the kalam